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Abstract—In the private matching problem, a client and a
server each hold a set of n input elements. The client wants to
privately compute the intersection of these two sets: he learns
which elements he has in common with the server (and nothing
more), while the server gains no information at all. In certain
applications it would be useful to have a private matching
protocol that reports a match even if two elements are only
similar instead of equal. Such a private matching protocol is
called fuzzy, and is useful, for instance, when elements may be
inaccurate or corrupted by errors.
We consider the fuzzy private matching problem, in a semi-
honest environment. Elements are similar if they match on t
out of T attributes. First we show that the original solution
proposed by Freedman et al. [1] is incorrect. Subsequently we
present two fuzzy private matching protocols. The first, simple,
protocol has bit message complexity O(n
`
T
t
´
(T log |D| + k)).
The second, improved, protocol has a much better bit message
complexity of O(nT (log |D| + k)), but here the client incurs a
O(n) factor time complexity. Additionally, we present protocols
based on the computation of the Hamming distance and on
oblivious transfer, that have different, sometimes more efficient,
performance characteristics.
Index Terms—fuzzy matching, secure 2-party computation,
secret sharing
I. INTRODUCTION
In the private matching problem [1], a client and a server
each hold a set of elements as their input. The size of the set
is n and the type of elements is publicly known. The client
wants to privately compute the intersection of these two sets:
the client learns the elements it has in common with the server
(and nothing more), while the server obtains no information
at all.
In certain applications, the elements (think of them as words
consisting of letters, or tuples of attributes) may not always
be accurate or completely known. For example, due to errors,
omissions, or inconsistent spelling, entries in a database may
not be identical. In these cases, it would be useful to have a
private matching algorithm that reports a match even if two
entries are similar, but not necessarily equal. Such a private
matching is called fuzzy, and was introduced by Freedman et
al. [1]. Elements are called similar (or matching) in this
context if they match on t out of T letters at the right locations.
Fuzzy private matching (FPM) protocols could also be
used to implement a more secure and private algorithm of
biometric pattern matching. Instead of sending the complete
template corresponding to say a scanned fingerprint, a fuzzy
private matching protocol could be used to determine the
similarity of the scanned fingerprint with the templates stored
in the database, without revealing any information about this
template in the case that no match is found.
All known solutions for fuzzy private matching, as well as
our own protocols, work in a semi-honest environment. In this
environment participants do not deviate from their protocol,
but may use any (additional) information they obtain to their
own advantage.
Freedman et al. [1] introduce the fuzzy private matching
problem and present a protocol for 2-out-of-3 fuzzy private
matching. We show that, unfortunately, this protocol is incor-
rect (see Section III): the client can “steal” elements even if
the sets have no similar elements in common.
Building and improving on their ideas, we present two
protocols for t-out-of-T fuzzy private matching (henceforth
simply called fuzzy private matching or FPM for short). The
first, simple, protocol has time complexity O(n
(
T
t
)
) and bit
message complexity O(n
(
T
t
)
(T log |D|+k)) (protocol 3). The
second protocol is based on linear secret sharing and has
a much better bit message complexity O(nT (log |D| + k))
(protocol 5). Here the client incurs a O(n2(T
t
)
) time com-
plexity penalty. Note that this is only a factor n worse than
the previous protocol. We also present a simpler version
of protocol 5 (protocol 4) to explain the techniques used
incrementally. This protocol has a slightly worse bit message
complexity.
Note that, contrary to intuition, fuzzy extractors and secure
sketches ([2]) cannot be used to solve fuzzy private matching
problem.
Indyk and Woodruff [3] present another approach for solv-
ing fuzzy private matching, using the computation of the Ham-
ming distance together with generic techniques like secure 2-
party computations and oblivious transfer. Generic multi-party
computation and oblivious transfer are considered not to be
efficient techniques. Therefore, based on the protocol from
[3], we design protocols based on computation the Hamming
distance that do not use secure 2-party computation. One
protocol is efficient for small domains of letters (protocol
6 version 1) and the second protocol uses oblivious transfer
(protocol 6 version 2). The major drawback of the first protocol
is a strong dependence on the size of the domain of letters. The
main weakness of the second protocol is its high complexity
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1 For the sake of simplicity time complexities are given roughly in numbers
of efficient operations (e.g., secret sharing’s reconstructions, encryptions,
polynomial’s evaluations etc.); we also report here only the complexity of
the slowest participant
2 the authors of the paper do not give exact complexity in the O notation.
3 protocol with subroutine from first paragraph of section VI-A.
4 protocol with subroutine equality-matrix from Figure 7.
Fig. 1. Results overview
– in the protocol there are n2 · T oblivious transfer calls. We
present these protocols mainly to show that other approaches
to solve the fuzzy private matching problem exist as well.
We compare our protocols to existing solutions using sev-
eral complexity measures in Table 1. One of these com-
plexity measures is the O˜ notation used for the bit mes-
sage complexity in [3]. This notation is defined as fol-
lows. For functions f and g, we write f = O˜(g) if
f(n, k) = O
(
g(n, k) logO(1)(n) · poly(k)
)
, where k is
the security parameter. This notation hides certain factors like
a strong dependence on the security parameter k (e.g. k3), and
is therefore less accurate than the standard big-O notation. We
prefer this measure for the plain message complexity, where
we restrict the bit size of the messages to be linear in k.
Related work can be traced back to private equality test-
ing [4], [5], [1], [6] in the 2-party case, where each party has
a single element and wants to know if they are equal (without
publishing these elements). Private set intersection [1], [6],
[7] (possibly among more than two parties) is also related.
In this problem the output of all the participants should be
the intersection of all the input sets, but nothing more: a
participant should gain no knowledge about elements from
other participant’s sets that are not in the intersection.
Similarly related are the so called secret handshaking pro-
tocols [8], [9], [10]. They consider membership of a secret
group, and allow members of such groups to reliably iden-
tify fellow group members without giving away their group
membership to non-members and eavesdroppers. We note that
the (subtle) difference between secret handshaking and set-
intersection protocols lies in the fact that a set-intersection
protocol needs to be secure for arbitrary element domains
(small ones in particular), whereas group membership for
handshaking protocols can be encoded using specially con-
structed secret values taken from a large domain.
Privacy issues have also been considered for the approxima-
tion of a function f among vectors owned by several parties.
The function f may be Euclidean distance ([11], [12], [3]),
set difference ([1]), Hamming distance ([11], [3]), or scalar
product (reviewed in [13]).
Our paper is structured as follows. We formally define the
fuzzy private matching problem in Section II, and introduce
our system model, some additional notation, and primitives
there as well. Then in Section III we present the solution
from [1] for 2-out-of-3 fuzzy private matching and show where
it breaks down. Section IV contains our first protocol for t-
out-of-T fuzzy private matching that uses techniques similar
to the ones used in [1]. Then we present our second protocol
based on linear secret sharing in Section V. Finally, Section
VI presents two protocols based on the computation of a
Hamming distance. All our protocols assume a semi-honest
environment (see Section II-B).
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the fuzzy matching problem
as well as the mathematical and cryptographic tools that we
use to construct our protocols.
A. Fuzzy Private Matching Problem Definition
Let a client and a server each own a set of words. A fuzzy
private matching protocol is a 2-party protocol between a client
and a server, that allows the client to compute the fuzzy set
intersection of these sets (without leaking any information to
the server).
To be precise, let each word X = x1 . . . xT in these sets
consist of T letters xi from a domain D. Let X = x1 . . . xT
and Y = y1 . . . yT . We define X ≈t Y (X and Y match on t
letters) if and only if t ≤ |{k : xk = yk ∩ (1 ≤ k ≤ T )}|.
The input and the output of the protocol are defined as
follows. The client input is the set X = {X1, . . . XnC} of
nC words of length T , while the server’s input is defined as
Y = {Y1, . . . YnS} of nS words of length T . Both the client
and the server have also in their inputs nC , nS , T and t. The
output of the client is the set {Yi ∈ Y |∃Xi ∈ X : Xi ≈t Yj}.
This set consist of all the elements from Y that match with
any element from the set X . The server’s output is empty
(the server does not learn anything). Usually we assume that
nC = nS = n. In any case, the sizes of the sets are fixed and
a priori known to the other party (so the protocol does not
have to prevent the other party to learn the size of the set).
B. Adversary Models
We prove correctness of our protocols only against com-
putationally bounded (with respect to a security parameter k)
and semi-honest adversary, meaning the the parties follow the
protocol but may keep message histories in an attempt to learn
more than is prescribed. Here we provide the intuition and the
informal notion of this model, the reader is referred to [14]
for full definitions. To simplify matters we only consider the
case of only two participants, the client and the server.
We have chosen the semi-honest model for a few reasons.
First of all, there had not been made any “really” efficient
solution for FPM problem in any model. Secondly, our proto-
cols seem to be secure against malicious clients and the only
possible attacks are on the correctness of the protocols by
malicious servers. Moreover in [15], [16], [17], it is shown
how to transform a semi-honest protocol into a protocol
secure in the malicious model. Further, [17] does this at a
communication blowup of at most a small factor of poly(k).
Therefore, we assume parties are semi-honest in the remainder
of the paper (however we are aware that the mentioned generic
transformations are not too efficient).
We leave improving protocols to work efficiently in ma-
licious environment and proofs that the protocols from this
paper are secure against malicious clients for future work.
In the model with a semi-honest adversary, both parties
are assumed to act accordingly to the protocol (but they
are allowed to use all information that they collect in an
unexpected way to obtain extra information). The security
definition is straightforward in our particular case, as only one
party (the client) learns the output. Following [1] we divide
the requirements into:
• The client’s security – indistinguishably: Given that the
server gets no output from the protocol, the definition of
the client’s privacy requires simply that the server cannot
distinguish between cases in which the client has different
inputs.
• The server’s security – comparison to the ideal model:
The definition ensures that the client does not get more or
different information than the output of the function. This
is formalized by considering an ideal implementation
where a trusted third party TTP gets the inputs of the two
parties and outputs the defined function. We require that
in the real implementation of the protocol (one without
TTP) the client does not learn different information than
in the ideal implementation.
Due to space constraints our proofs are informal, presenting
only the main arguments for correctness and security.
C. Additively Homomorphic Cryptosystem
In all our protocols we use a semantically secure, additively
homomorphic public-key cryptosystem, e.g., Paillier’s cryp-
tosystem [18]. Let {·}K denote the encryption function with
the public key K . The homomorphic cryptosystem supports
the following two operations, which can be performed without
the knowledge of the private key.
1) Given the encryptions {a}K and {b}K , of a and b, one
can efficiently compute the encryption of a+ b, denoted
{a+ b}K := {a}K +h {b}K
2) Given a constant c and the encryption {a}K , of a, one
can efficiently compute the encryption of c · a, denoted
{a · c}K := {a}K ·h c
These properties hold for suitable operations +h and ·h defined
over the range of the encryption function. In Paillier’s system,
operation +h is a multiplication and ·h is an exponentiation.
1) Remark: The domain R of the plaintext of the homo-
morphic cryptosystem in all of our protocols (unless specified
differently) is defined as follows: R should be larger than DT
(or in some protocols D) and a uniformly random element
from R should be in DT (or D) with negligible probability.
This property can be satisfied by representing an element
a ∈ DT (or in some protocols a ∈ D) by ra = 0k||a in
R. The domain R should be a field (e.g., Zq for some prime
q).
2) Operations on encrypted polynomials: We represent any
polynomial p of degree n (on some ring) as the ordered list
of its coefficients: [α0, α1, . . . αn]. We denote the encryption
of a polynomial p by {p}K and define it to be the list of
encryptions of its coefficients: [{α0}K , {α1}K , . . . {αn}K ].
Many operations can be performed on such encrypted poly-
nomials like: addition of two encrypted polynomials or multi-
plication of an encrypted and a plain polynomial. We use the
following property: given an encryption of a polynomial {p}K
and some x one can efficiently compute a value {p(x)}K . This
follows from the properties of the homomorphic encryption
scheme:
{p(x)}K =
(
nX
i=0
αi · x
i
)
K
=
nX
h
i=0
{αi · x
i}K =
nX
h
i=0
{αi}K ·h x
i
D. Linear Secret Sharing
Some of our protocols use t-out-of-T secret sharing. The
secret s is split into T secret shares si, such that any combi-
nation of at least t such shares can be used to reconstruct s.
Combining less than t individual shares gives no information
whatsoever about the secret.
A Linear t-out-of-T Secret Sharing (LSS) scheme is a secret
sharing scheme with the following property: given t shares
si (of secret s), and t shares ri (of secret r) on the same
indices, using si+ri one can reconstruct the sum of the secrets
s+r. One such LSS scheme is Shamir’s original secret sharing
scheme [19].
III. THE ORIGINAL FPM PROTOCOL
Freedman et al. [1] proposed a fuzzy private matching
protocol for the case where T = 3 and t = 2 (see Figure 2).
Unfortunately, their protocol is incorrect.
1) The idea behind, and the problem of the protocol from
Figure 2: Intuitively the protocol works because if Xi ≈2 Yj
then, say, x2i = y2j and x3i = y3j . Hence P2(x2i ) = P2(y2j ) = ri
and P3(x3i ) = P3(y3j ) = ri so P2(y2i )−P3(y3j ) = 0. Then the
result {r′ · (P2(y2j )−P3(y3j )) + Yj}K sent back by the server
simplifies to {Yj}K (the random value r′ is canceled by the
encryption of 0) which the client can decrypt. If Xi and Yj do
not match, the random values r, r′ and r′′ do not get canceled
and effectively blind the value of Yj in the encryption, hiding
it to the client.
1) The client chooses a private key sk, a public key K and parameters
for the additively homomorphic encryption scheme and sends K and
the parameters to the server.
2) The client:
a) chooses, for every i (such that 1 ≤ i ≤ nC ), a random value
ri ∈ R.
b) creates 3 polynomials: P1, P2, P3 over R (where polynomial Pj is
used to encode all letters on the jth position) defined by the set of
equations
ri = P1(x1i ) = P2(x
2
i ) = P3(x
3
i ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ nC .
c) uses interpolation to calculate coefficients of the polynomials
(P1, P2, P3) and sends their encryptions to the server.
3) For each Yj (such that 1 ≤ j ≤ nS ), the server responds to the client:
{r · (P1(y1j )− P2(y
2
j )) + Yj}K , {r
′ · (P2(y2j )− P3(y
3
j )) + Yj}K ,
{r′′ · (P1(y1j ) − P3(y
3
j )) + Yj}K , where r, r′, r′′ are fresh random
values in R. This uses the properties of the homomorphic encryption
scheme including the encrypted polynomials explained in Section II-C2.
4) If the client receives an encryption of an encoding of Yi, which is
similar to any word from his set X , then he adds it to the output set.
Fig. 2. Original FPM protocol
There is however a problem with this approach. Consider
the following input data. The input of the client is {[1, 2, 3]
, [1, 4, 5]}, while the input of the server is {[5, 4, 3]}. Then
in step 2c of the protocol, the polynomials are defined (by
the client) in the following way: P1(1) = r1 ∩ P1(1) = r2,
P2(2) = r1 ∩ P2(4) = r2 and P3(3) = r1 ∩ P3(5) = r2.
But now we see that, unless r1 = r2 (which is unlikely
when they are both chosen at random), P1 remains undefined!
Freedman et al. do not consider this possibility. However, if
we try to remedy this problem by setting r1 = r2 we run
into another one. Among other things, the server computes
{r′ · (P2(y
2
i ) − P3(y
3
i )) + Yi}K , which, in this particular
case equals {r′ · (P2(4) − P3(3)) + [5, 4, 3]}K . This equals
{r′ · (r2− r1)+ [5, 4, 3]}K , which by equality of r1 and r2 re-
duces to {[5, 4, 3]}K. In other words, the client learns [5, 4, 3]
even if this value does not match any of the elements held by
the client. This violates the requirements of the fuzzy private
matching problem: if a semi-honest client happens to own a
set of tuples with a property similar to the counterexample
above, it learns a tuple of the server.
IV. A POLYNOMIAL BASED PROTOCOL
The protocol of the previous section can be fixed, but in
a slightly more elaborate way. Our solution works for any T
and t, and is presented in Figure 3. In the protocol we use
the following definition. Let σ be a combination of t different
indices σ1, σ2, . . . , σt from the range {1, . . . , T } (there are
(
T
t
)
of those). For a word X ∈ DT , define σ(X) = xσ1 || · · · ||xσt
(i.e., the concatenation of the letters in X found at the indices
in the combination). We now discuss the correctness, security
and complexity of this protocol.
2) Correctness: In the protocol, the client produces (T
t
)
polynomials Pσ of degree nC . Every polynomial represents
one of the combinations σ of t letters from T letters. In fact,
the roots of the polynomial Pσ are σ(Xi) It is easy to see
that if X ≈t Y then σ(X) = σ(Y ) for some combination σ.
Hence, if Xi ≈t Yj then Pσ(σ(Yj)) = 0 for some Pσ received
and evaluated in step 3a. When that happens, the encryption
1) The client chooses a private key sk, a public key K and parameters
for the additively homomorphic encryption scheme and sends K and
the parameters to the server.
2) For every combination σ of t out of T indices the client:
a) constructs a polynomial:
Pσ(x) = (x−σ(X1)) · (x−σ(X2)) · · · (x−σ(XnC )) of degree
nC with domain DT and range R.
b) sends {Pσ}K (the encrypted polynomial) to the server.
3) For every Yi ∈ Y , 1 ≤ i ≤ nS , and every received polynomial
{Pσ}K (corresponding to the combination σ) the server:
a) evaluates polynomial {Pσ}K at the point σ(Yi) to compute
{wσi }K = {r ∗ Pσ(σ(Yi)) + Yi}K , where r ∈ R is always a
fresh random value.
b) sends {wσi }K to the client.
4) The client decrypts all received messages. If for such a decryption
wσi ≈t Xj for any Xj ∈ X , then he adds wσi to the output set.
Fig. 3. Polynomial Based Protocol solving FPM problem
of Yj is sent to the client. Later on, the client can recognize
this value by the convention that values in DT are represented
in R using a 0k prefix. Otherwise (if Yj does not match with
any element from X) all the values sent to the client contain
a random blinding element r (and therefore their decryptions
are in Y with negligible probability).
3) Security: The client’s input data is secure because all the
data received by the server are encrypted (using a semantically
secure cryptosystem). Hence the server cannot distinguish
between different client’s inputs. The privacy of the server is
protected because the client only learns about those elements
from Y that are also in X , and because (by semi-honesty) it
does not send specially constructed polynomials to cheat the
server. If an element yi ∈ Y does not belong to X then a
random value is sent by the server (see the correctness proof
above).
4) Complexity: The messages being sent in this protocol are
encryptions of plaintext from the domain R, i.e., O(T log |D|+
k) bits. In step 2 the client sends
(
T
t
)
polynomials of degree
nC (sending each coefficient separately). Then in step 3 the
server responds with nS values for every polynomial. Hence
in total O((nS +nC) ·
(
T
t
)
) messages are sent. Therefore, the
total bit complexity is O((nS + nC) ·
(
T
t
)
· (T log |D|+ k)).
The time complexity is the same as the number of messages
in protocol O((nS + nC) ·
(
T
t
)
).
V. SECRET SHARING BASED PROTOCOLS
The number of messages sent in the previous protocol is
very large. Therefore, we now present two protocols solving
the FPM problem based on linear secret sharing that trade
a decrease in message complexity for an increase in time
complexity. Both work in the model with a semi-honest
adversary. First we describe the simple (but slow) protocol
and later the faster, improved one. We present the simple
version mainly to facilitate the understanding of the improved
protocol.
A. A Simple Version of the Protocol
The simple protocol is presented in Figure 4. The idea
behind the protocol is the following. The server encrypts all
1) The client generates sk, K and parameters for the additively homo-
morphic cryptosystem and sends K and the parameters to the server.
2) For each Xi ∈ X
a) The client encrypts each letter xwi of Xi and sends {xwi }K to the
server.
b) For each Yj ∈ Y , run the protocol find-matching(i,j).
find-matching(i,j):
1) The server generates skj and parameters for the symmetric cryptosys-
tem and sends parameters to the client.
2) The server sends byj = Eskj (Yj) to the client.
3) The server prepares t–out–of–T secret shares [s1, s2, . . . sT ] with
secret 0k ||skj , where k is the security parameter.
4) For every letter ywj in Yj , the server computes:
vw = (({xwi }K −h {y
w
j }K) ·h r) +h {s
w}K which equals
{((xwi − y
w
j ) · r + s
w)}K , where r is always a fresh, random value
from the domain of plaintext.
5) The server sends [v1, v2, . . . vT ] to the client.
6) The client decrypts the values and checks whether it is possible to
reconstruct the secret 0k||z from them. In order to do that, he needs to
try all possible combinations of t among the T decrypted (potential)
shares. If it is possible and Decz( byj) ≈t Xi then he adds Decz( byj)
to his output set.
Fig. 4. Simple secret sharing protocol solving FPM problem
its words Yj using separate symmetric keys skj and sends the
results to the client. The protocol then proceeds to reveal key
skj to the client only if there is a word Xi such that Xi ≈t Yj .
Every word Xi of the client is matched with each word Yj
of the server one by one. To this end, the client first sends
each letter of Xi to the server, encrypted to the public key of
the server separately.
Upon reception of the encrypted letters for Xi, the server
does the following for each word Yj in his set (using the
subroutine find-matching(i,j)). Firstly the server prepares
secret key (skj for corresponding word Yj) for the symmetric
encryption scheme (e.g., AES), and sends the encrypted Yj to
the client. Then it prepares t-out-of-T random secret shares
s1, . . . , sT such that s = 0k||skj . Share si is "attached" to the
i-th letter of word Yj , so to speak. Note that each time a new
word Xi from the client is matched with Yj , fresh secret shares
are generated to avoid an attack similar to the one described
in section III.
Using the homomorphic properties of the encryption
scheme, the server then computes for each encrypted letter
{xwi }K it received, the value vw = {((xwi − ywj ) · r + sw)}K
(using a fresh random value r each time, and encrypting ywj
to the public key K). Note that vw = {sw}K if and only if
xwi = y
w
j .
Finally, the server sends v1, . . . , vT back to the client. The
client decrypts these values, and if Xi ≈t Yj , then by the
observation in the previous paragraph, among the decrypted
values there are at least t shares sw from which skj and
therefore Yj can be reconstructed.
Due to space constraints we skip the proofs of correctness
and security of the protocol from Figure 4 (they can be found
in the appendix).
1) Complexity: Two kinds of messages are sent in this
protocol. Messages encrypted by homomorphic encryption
scheme are from the domain O(log |D|+ k) bits. The second
kind of messages are the messages encrypted by the symmetric
encryption scheme (they are sent in step 2 of the subroutine).
They are encryptions of plaintext from the domain DT .
The main impact on the message complexity of the protocol
is the fact that the subroutine find-matching is called
nCnS times. In this subroutine, the server sends O(T ) cipher-
texts in step 5 . Hence, in total O(nCnST ) messages of size
O(log |D|+ k) and O(nS) messages of size O(log |D|T + k)
are sent in this protocol. Therefore, the bit complexity of the
protocol is: O(nCnST (log |D|+ k) + nS(log |D|T + k)) =
O(nCnST (log |D|+ k)).
We see that by first encrypting the words stored by the
server using symmetric keys, and later using the secret sharing
mechanism to reveal these keys instead of the full words,
changes the bit complexity from O(T (log |D|T + k)) to
O(T (log |D|+ k)), removing a factor T .
The server prepares nSnC times the T secret shares. Pro-
ducing T secret shares can be done efficiently and therefore
the time complexity of the server is reasonably low. The client
(in step 6 for each subroutine call) verifies if he can reconstruct
the secret Yj . This verification costs
(
T
t
)
reconstructions (and
one reconstruction can be done efficiently). The number of
reconstructions is in the order of O(nSnC
(
T
t
)
), which is the
major drawback of this protocol.
B. An Improved Protocol
We can improve the message complexity by combining the
idea of using secret sharing (protocol 4) with the idea of
encoding all characters at position w using a polynomial Pw
(protocol 2). The resulting protocol for FPM is presented in
Figure 5. It consists of two phases: a polynomial phase, and
a ticket phase.
The polynomial phase runs as follows. As in the previous
protocol, words are first sent encrypted to the client, while the
key skj is encoded using a secret sharing scheme such that
when the client has a word matching on letter w, it obtains
share sjw.
However, we now encode the shares at letter position w
using a polynomial Pw defined by
(Pw(yw1 ) = s1
w)∩ (Pw(yw2 ) = s2
w)∩ . . .∩ (Pw(ywn ) = sn
w)
(where, for technical reasons, at least random point is added
to ensure privacy in the case xwi 6= ywj ). This polynomial is
sent to the client to allow him to recover share siw for each
letter xwi = ywj . In fact, it is sent encrypted to the client; more
about this later.
We need to avoid the problem discussed in section III with
the original FPM protocol. Observe that the above definition
of Pw is only valid if we require that siw = sjw whenever
ywi = y
w
j . This means that, as we proceed through to the list
of words Yj of the server constructing secret shares for key
skj , we accumulate restrictions on the possible share values
we can use. In the extreme case, for some word Yj , T shares
could already be fixed! If T was the total number of shares,
then skj would be fixed and we would have the same leakage
of information discussed in section III.
We solve this problem by adding an extra shares sjT+1, . . .
(that are in fact sent to the client in the clear!) and changing
the parameters of the secret sharing scheme, as follows. We
observe that if at most T shares can get fixed as described
above, the best we can do is create a (T + 1)-out-of-(T + x)
scheme. This ensures that an arbitrary skj can actually be
encoded by the secret sharing scheme, even given T fixed
shares. The x extra shares are given away "for free" to the
client. Now to ensure that the client needs at least t letters that
match word Yj in order to be able to reconstruct skj form the
shares it receives, we need t = T +1− x i.e., x = T +1− t.
In other words, we use a (T +1)-out-of-(2 ·T+1−t) secret
sharing scheme where for each word Yj
• the first T shares are encoded using polynomials
P 1, . . . , PT , and
• the remaining T +1− t shares are given the client in the
clear.
If Xi ≈t Yj , then the client obtains at least t shares using the
polynomials P 1, . . . , PT . Combined with the T +1− t shares
it got for free, it owns at least T + 1 shares that allow it to
reconstruct the secret. Note, however, that when it obtains the
shares by evaluating the polynomial for the letters in Xi, it
does not know to which Yj these shares actually correspond.
So in fact to actually try to reconstruct the secret, it needs to
combine these shares with each group of free T +1− t shares
corresponding to Y1 up to Yn one by one.
This works, but it still leaves the leakage of information
problem discussed in section III when several different words
held by the client each match on some characters of a word
Yj held by the client, such that t shares for skj are released
even though no single word of the client actually matches Yj .
This problem is solved in the ticket phase, as follows.
In fact, the polynomials sent by the server to the client
are encrypted using the homomorphic encryption scheme.
Therefore, when evaluating the polynomials for a word Xi, the
client only obtains the encrypted shares corresponding to it.
These are useless by themselves. The client needs the help of
the server to decrypt these shares. In doing so, the server will
enforce that the shares the client receives in the end actually
correspond to a single word in the client set (and not a mix
of shares obtained using letters from different words as in the
attack described in the previous paragraph).
The server enforces this using so-called tickets (hence the
name: ticket phase). Tickets are in fact (T +1)-out-of-(2 ·T+
1− t) random secret shares for the secret 0. The clients sends
groups of encrypted shares (blinded by random values) that
he got for every word Xi to the server. The server, for every
group of shares received from the client, decrypts these shares
and adds the tickets shares. The result is sent back to the
client, who unblinds the result (subtracting the random value).
Because of the linear property of the secret sharing scheme,
the secret corresponding to the shares the client receives in the
end (that are the sum of the original share and the ticket share)
has not changed. But if the client tries to combine different
shares obtained form different words, the shares of the tickets
Polynomial Phase:
1) The server prepares sk, K and parameters for the additively homo-
morphic cryptosystem and sends K and the parameters to the client.
2) For all Yj ∈ Y , the server generates skj and parameters for the
symmetric cryptosystem and sends parameters to the client. Later the
server sends byj = Eskj (0k||Yj) to the client.
3) For all Yj ∈ Y , the server prepares [T + 1]–out–of–[2 · T − t + 1]
secret shares [sj1, sj2, . . . sj2·T−t+1] with the secret 0k ||skj , where
k is the security parameter. If ywj = ywm then sjw = smw .
The server sends [sjT+1, . . . sj2·T−t+1] to the client.
4) The server prepares T polynomials (for w = 1 to T ) of degree n :
a) The polynomial is defined in the following way:
((Pw(yw1 ) = s1w)∩ (Pw(yw2 ) = s2w)∩ . . . (Pw(ywn ) = snw))
The number of points is increased to n+1 by adding random points
(at least one random point is added).
b) The server computes the coefficients of the polynomials and en-
crypts each polynomial {Pw}K and sends it to the client.
5) The client evaluates T polynomials (for w = 1 to T ) on each letter of
each word (for i = 1 to n): {vwi }K = {Pw(xwi )}K . If xwi = ywm
then vwi = smw .
6) The client blinds the results vwi with a random values rwi and sends
them to the server: {vwi + rwi }K .
Ticket Phase:
6) For i = 1 to n, the server prepares [T + 1]–out–of–[2 · T − t + 1]
secret shares [τi1, τi2, . . . τi2·T−t+1] with secret 0. Later he sends
[τiT+1, . . . τi2·T−t+1] to the client.
7) For i = 1 to n and for w = 1 to T , the server decrypts the received
messages Dsk({vwi +rwi }K) and sends (vwi +rwi +τiw) to the client.
8) The client unblinds them (by subtracting rwi ) obtaining qwi .
If xwi = ywm then qwi = smw + τiw .
9) For i = 1 to n and j = 1 to n, the client checks if it is
possible to reconstruct the secret 0k||z from: [q1i , q2i , . . . qTi , sjT+1+
τi
T+1, sj
T+2 + τi
T+2, . . . sj
2·T−t+1 + τi
2·T−t+1].
In order to do that, the client needs to try all possible combinations
of t shares among the T decrypted q shares (the rest of the shares
is the same during reconstructions). If it is possible and for any byj ,
Decz( byj) = 0k||a, and a matches Xi then he adds a to his output
set.
Fig. 5. Improved secret sharing protocol solving FPM problem
hidden within them no longer match and reconstruction of the
secret is prevented.
Due to space constraints we skip the proofs of correctness
(that is essentially similar to the discussion above) of the
protocol from Figure 5. This proof can be found in the
appendix.
1) Security: The privacy of the client’s input data is secure
because all of the data received by the server (in step 6 of
the polynomial phase) is of the form: vwi + rwi , where rwi is
a random value from the domain of the plaintext. Hence the
server cannot distinguish between different client inputs.
The privacy of the server is protected because the client
receives correct secret shares of some skj (corresponding to
Yj ∈ Y ) if and only if there is an element Xi ∈ X such
that Xi ≈t Yj . In the polynomial phase, the client receives
encrypted polynomials and n groups with T − t + 1 shares
([siT+1, . . . si[2·T−t+1]] ) of [T+1]–out–of–[2·T−t+1] secret
sharing scheme. Hence, there is no leakage of information
in the polynomial phase. The client receives information in
plaintext in steps 6 and 7 of the ticket phase. In this situation,
the client has at least T +1 correct secret shares during step 7
and he can reconstruct the secret 0k||skm (and therefore, Ym).
If there is no such element in X to which Yj is similar,
then the client receives no more than t shares in every group
qi of potential shares: qwi = τiw+ sjw (where i is an index of
the received group of potential shares). The other values (for
incorrect letters) include Pw(ywj ) that cannot be determined.
It is caused by the fact that the client does not know enough
points (degree of the polynomial is n + 1 and the client can
know only n points) defining the polynomial and at least
one unknown point is random. This is exactly the situation
like in a polynomial based secret sharing scheme when not
enough shares are known. The client cannot reconstruct skj
for any group separately (by the secret sharing assumption),
because he has less than T + 1 correct secret shares. Of all
the shares, (T − t + 1) come from values that are sent in
plaintext. For every group of shares, τ values are different and
therefore make every received group of shares independent.
The probability that a random value from R is a correct
share is negligible (with respect to a security parameter k).
Therefore, the probability that the client can recover illicit
information is negligible.
2) Complexity: In step 2 the server sends n messages
encrypted by the symmetric encryption scheme that are from
the domain O(log |D|T +k) (that is O(n(T log |D|+k)) bits).
Later in step 3 the server sends O(nT ) unencrypted messages
from the domain O(k + log |D|) (that is O(nT (log |D|+ k))
bits). In step 4 the server sends encryptions of T polynomials
of degree n. This totals to O(nT (log |D| + k)) bits. For
every received polynomial, the client computes n values and
sends them encrypted to the server (again O(nT (log |D|+k))
bits). In the ticket phase, in step 7, the server sends O(nT )
unencrypted messages, that is O(nT (log |D|+k)) bits. Hence,
the bit complexity of the entire protocol totals to: O(nT (k +
log |D|) + n(k + log |D|T )) = O(nT (k + log |D|)).
The main part of the server time complexity is preparing 2n
times [T+1]–out–of–[2·T−t+1] secret shares. Since produc-
ing (2·T−t+1) secret shares can be done efficiently, the time
complexity of the server is reasonable. The crucial part for the
time complexity of the client is step 9 (which is performed n2
times). In this step the client checks whether he can reconstruct
the secret Yj . This verification costs
(
T
t
)
reconstructions (and
one reconstruction can be done efficiently). The total number
of reconstructions is in the order of O(n2
(
T
t
)
), which is the
major drawback of this protocol.
VI. HAMMING DISTANCE BASED PROTOCOL
In this section we present two protocols solving the FPM
problem based on computing the encrypted Hamming dis-
tance: one that is simple and efficient for small domains
and another that uses oblivious transfer. The difference be-
tween them is only the implementation of the subroutine
equality-matrix (the frame of the protocol is the same
for both of them). Firstly we describe the simple protocol and
later the one using oblivious transfer.
A technique to compute the encrypted Hamming distance to
solve the FPM problem has been introduced in [3]. However,
the protocol in that paper uses generic 2-party computations
1) The client prepares sk, K and the parameters for the additively
homomorphic cryptosystem and sends K and the parameters to the
server.
2) Run subroutine equality-matrix. After this subroutine the server
has obtained the following matrix:
f(w, i, j) =

{0}K , for xwi = ywj
{1}K , for xwi 6= ywj
,
where w ∈ {1, . . . T} and i, j ∈ {1, . . . n}
3) For each Xi ∈ X and Yj ∈ Y :
a) the server computes {∆(Xi, Yj)}K = {
PT
w=1 f(i, j, w)}K and,
for ℓ = 0 to T − t, sends {(∆(Xi, Yj)− ℓ) · r+ (0k ||Yj))}K to
the client. Here r is always a fresh, random value.
b) The client decrypts all T−t messages and if any plaintext is in DT
and matches any word from X , then the client adds this plaintext
to the output set.
Fig. 6. Hamming distance based protocol for the FPM problem
together with oblivious transfer, making their approach less
practical.
Our protocol (see Figure 6) works as follows. The server
first obtains, using the subroutine equality-matrix, a 3-
dimensional matrix f(w, i, j) containing the encrypted equal-
ity test for the w-th letter in words Xi and Yj (where {0}K
denotes equality and {1}K denotes inequality). The server
sums the entries in this matrix to compute the encrypted
Hamming distance dji = ∆(Xi, Yj) between the words Xi and
Yj . Subsequently, the server sends Yj blinded by a random
value r multiplied by dji − ℓ, for all 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ T − t. If
0 ≤ dji ≤ T − t, then for some ℓ the value Yj is not blinded
at all. This allows the client to recover Yj . Otherwise Yj is
blinded by some random value for every ℓ, and the client learns
nothing.
3) Correctness and Security of the protocol from Figure 6:
Assuming that in the subroutine equality-matrix the
matrix f has been securely obtained, protocol 6 calculates a
correct output. This can be concluded from the following facts:
if Xi ≈t Yj then (in step 3a) ∆(Xi, Yj) ∈ { 0 . . . T − t },
and therefore {0k||Yj}K is sent to the client. Privacy of the
server is protected because in step 3a if Xi 6≈t Yj then
∆(Xi, Yj) 6∈ {0, . . . T−t} and therefore all values received by
the client look random to him. Correctness and security proofs
of this protocol resemble the proofs of the protocol presented
in Figure 4 and are omitted here.
A. Implementing Subroutine equality-matrix
The first method to implement the subrou-
tine equality-matrix is as follows. The client sends
the letters of all his words to the server as encrypted
vectors dwi : {0, . . . |D| − 1} (where i ∈ {1, . . . nC} and
w ∈ {1, . . . T }) such that dwi (v) = {1}K if v = xwi , and
dwi (v) = {0}K otherwise. This process can be described
as sending encryptions of unary encoding of the letters
of all his words. Subsequently the server defines the
matrix as f(w, i, j) = dwi (ywj ). The main drawback of
this method is that its bit complexity includes a factor
O(|D| ·n · T + n2 · (T − t)). However, the protocol is simple,
and for small domains D (e.g., ASCII letters) it is efficient.
For constant size D and T ≈ t the bit complexity of the
1) The client generates vectors dwi : [0, . . . |D|−1] (where i ∈ {1, . . . nC}
and w ∈ {1, . . . T}) such that: dwi (v) = 1 if v = xwi , and dwi (v) = 0
otherwise.
2) The matrix f is defined in the following way (for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . n}
and w ∈ {1, . . . T}):
a) The client picks a random bit bwi,j .
b) The server and the client perform 1–out–of–|D| oblivious transfer as
follows. The client constructs hwi,j , which is a vector [0, . . . |D|−1]
as follows:
hwi,j = [d
w
i (0) ⊕ b
w
i,j , d
w
i (1) ⊕ b
w
i,j , . . . d
w
i (|D| − 1)⊕ b
w
i,j ].
The server wants to obtain a value from the vector hwi,j with an index
ywj . For that they perform the oblivious transfer protocol (where the
server has an index and the client an array). Subsequently, the server
obtains the value h = hwi,j(ywj ).
c) The client sends {bwi,j}K to the server.
d) f(w, i, j) =

{bwi,j}K , for h = 0
{1− bwi,j}K , for h = 1
Fig. 7. Subroutine equality-matrix based on oblivious transfer
protocol reduces to O˜(n2 + n · T ) (which is significantly
better than the bit complexity of the protocol from [3] in this
situation).
The second implementation of the subroutine is shown
in Figure 7. This implementation uses 1–out–of–q oblivious
transfer. An oblivious transfer is a 2-party protocol, where
a client has a vector of q elements, and the server chooses
any one of them in such a way that the server does not
learn more than one, and the client remains oblivious to the
value the server chooses. Such an oblivious transfer protocol
is described in [6]. The fastest implementation of oblivious
transfer works in time O˜(1).
The second version of the subroutine equality-matrix
uses such an oblivious transfer in the following way. Let
dwi be the unary encoding of xwi as defined above (in the
description of the first method of implementation). The client
chooses a random bit bwi,j . Next he constructs a vector hwi,j
which contains all bits of dwi , each blinded by the random
bit bwi,j . In other words hwi,j [x] = dwi (x) ⊕ bwi,j . Using an
oblivious transfer protocol, the server requests the ywj -th entry
in this vector, and obtains dwi (ywj )⊕bwi,j . By the obliviousness,
the client does not learn ywj , and the server does not learn
any other entry. Subsequently, the client sends the encryption
{bwi,j}K to the server. Based on this the server constructs
f(w, i, j) = {dwi (y
w
j )}K as explained in the protocol.
1) Corollary: These protocols are in general less efficient
in bit complexity than the improved protocol based on secret
sharing (see Section V-B, Figure 5). The first protocol is
efficient for small domains, but significantly less efficient for
large ones. In the second protocol there are n2 · T oblivious
transfer calls. Moreover, at this stage, we do not foresee a
way to improve these protocols. However, the protocols are
interesting because they do not use generic 2-party computa-
tions. Furthermore, the techniques being used contain novel
elements especially in the subroutine equality-matrix,
that presents a technique for obtaining the encryption of a
single bit using only one oblivious transfer.
VII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented a few protocols solving
the FPM problem. The most efficient one works in a linear
bit complexity with respect to the size of the input data and
the security parameter. This is a significant improvement over
existing protocols. The improvement comes at an expense of
a factor n increase in time complexity (but only at the client).
Currently, we are investigating how to speed up the time
complexity of the client by using error correcting coding
techniques.
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APPENDIX
a) Correctness and security of the protocol from Figure
4: In this protocol the client encrypts all of letters of all of his
words (with a unique secret key for every word) and sends the
results to the server. Then for every couple of words (Xi, Yj),
the participants run the subroutine find-matching. In the
subroutine firstly the server encrypts Yj with some random
secret key skj of symmetric encryption scheme. Later it
divides skj into T shares (with threshold t) and for every letter
in Yj calculates vw = {((xwi −ywj )·r+sw)}K . If xwi = ywj then
the client receives the correct share, otherwise a random value.
However, at this step the client cannot distinguish in which
situation he is (he cannot distinguish a random value from the
correct share). Then the client checks if he can reconstruct the
secret key using any combination of t out of the T elements
{Dsk(vw)|1 ≤ w ≤ T }. He recognizes the secret key by the
0k prefix, and the fact that decrypted by that secret key value is
similar with one of the words from his set. If he has less than
t correct secret shares then he cannot recover the secret key,
and the retrieved data looks random to him (this follows from
the security of the secret sharing scheme). Hence all required
elements from Y appear in the client’s output. The probability
that some incorrect element is in the output set is negligible.
The client input data is secure because all of the data
received by the server is encrypted (using the semantically
secure cryptosystem). Hence the server cannot distinguish
between different client inputs.
Privacy of the server is protected because the client receives
correct secret shares of some Yj ∈ Y if and only if there is
an element Xi ∈ X such that Xi ≈t Yj . In this situation the
client has at least t correct secret shares and he can reconstruct
the secret 0k||skj (and therefore, it can decrypt Yj). If there is
no element in X to which Yj is similar then the client receives
n independent groups of shares, which has no group with at
least t correct shares. Hence from any of these groups he
cannot retrieve any secret key. The probability that a random
value from R is a correct share is negligible (with respect to
security parameter k). Therefore the probability that the client
can recover an illicit secret is negligible.
b) Correctness of the protocol from Figure 5: The first
important issue appears in step 3 of the polynomial phase.
Here the server prepares n groups of [T +1]–out–of–[2 · T −
t + 1] shares [sj1, sj2, . . . sj2·T−t+1]. From the jth group he
can recover skj , and therefore, Yj . During the creation of these
shares the server uses the rule:
for w ∈ {1, . . . T }: if ywi = ywm then siw = smw. (1)
This rule is necessary because the first T shares from each
group are later encoded as polynomials.
This secret sharing is used here in the same role as the t–
out–of–T one. However if the t–out–of–T scheme is used, then
it is impossible to choose the proper value of secrets (e.g., two
matching, but different, words from Y , would have the same
secret because of Rule 1). Secret shares [siT+1, . . . si[2·T−t+1]]
are chosen arbitrarily only to enable proper values of the
secrets. To choose arbitrary secrets even for equal words (Y
could be a multiset) (T − t + 1) new shares (the ones that
are sent in plaintext) is exactly enough. The role of shares
[si
1, . . . si
T ] is like in classical secret sharing. Because the
last T − t+ 1 shares are known, the first T shares work like
a t–out–of–T secret sharing scheme.
Subsequently, in step 4, the server creates T polynomials
of degree n in such a way that evaluating a polynomial on
a corresponding letter from some word from Y results in
a corresponding secret share. Later he sends the encrypted
polynomials to the client. The client evaluates the polynomials
on his words and achieves {vwi }K (where the following
property holds: if xwi = ywm then vwi = smw). After the
ticket phase, the client receives T values qwi = vwi + τiw,
where [τi1, τi2, . . . τiT ] are tickets – secret shares with the
secret 0. Hence the client receives the group: [v1i + τi1, v2i +
τi
2, . . . vTi + τi
T ], where if xwi = ywm (for some Ym ∈ Y )
then vwi = smw. Therefore, by the linear property of LSS, if
vwi is a correct secret share, then qwi = vwi + τiw is also a
correct secret share. The client is trying to recover a secret
for every received group of potential shares. However, for a
proper reconstruction, he also needs shares that have been sent
to him in plaintext by the server. These shares are always
correct, but he needs to combine shares from the polynomial
and ticket phases. Moreover, he does not know which shares
from the polynomial phase correspond to the shares from the
ticket phase. As a result, the client has to check all of the
combinations (n2). If the client combines non-fitting shares
then he cannot recover the proper secret key (and therefore
the proper word).
Hence, for i, j ∈ {1, . . . n}, the client checks if he can
reconstruct the secret key from the following shares:
[q1i , q
2
i , . . . q
T
i , sj
T+1 + τi
T+1, sj
T+2 + τi
T+2, . . .
sj
2·T−t+1 + τi2·T−t+1] .
If enough corresponding secret shares are in the group qi,
then the secret that could be recovered from them is 0k||skm
(because the secret of τ shares is 0). Hence, in step 9 the
client recovers all of the secret keys that he has corresponding
shares of.
